Plotinus' Ethical Theory by Plass, Paul
19
PLOTINUS' ETHICAL THEORY
PAUL PLASS
In his treatise On Dialectic (1.3.6.6) Plotinus remarks that
the theoretical part of ethics is provided by dialectic,
while practical discipline is something 'added on.' Brief
though it is, this is an accurate account of the status of
ethics, which does rest directly on the ontological hierar-
chy traced by dialectic (1.3.4).
civic virtue true virtue noetic para- Good
deigm of virtue
matter body soul Mind One
Vice and civic virtue both center on bodily life but differ
in so far as the body dominates a life of vice, while the
soul is dominant in a life of civic virtue. Civic or 'natu-
ral' (1.3.6.18) virtue represents the best in traditional
public values (1.4.16.4; 1.2.7.25: the 'decent' and 'good'
man) . It is the general code of restraints and common de-
cencies which we observe to make life in the world with our
fellowmen possible. Since body and the irrational soul at
work in it (I. 8. 4. If) are closely tied to matter, they dis-
play an absence of measure, and civic virtue accordingly is
specifically the 'measure' imposed on physical passions
(I.2.2.11f ) .^^
As measures, civic virtues resemble the noetic paradeigm
from which they are derived, and for that reason Plotinus
concedes them a certain value. It is, he admits, unreason-
able to hold that civic virtues completely fail to make us
like the gods, and so tradition is correct in calling men of
great public virtue 'divine' (I.2.1.23f). Heracles is an
example: his active virtue and nobility won him the rank of
god (I . 1. 12. 31f ) . Similarly in his discussion of love
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(III. 5; 1.6) Plotinus follows Plato in allowing substantial
value to civic virtue, and in connection with reincarnation
he says that civic virtue guarantees that the soul will re-
appear in human form (III. 4. 2. 28).
But there is another side to the matter. Heracles' active
virtue is actually embodied in his ghost and that is in Hades
(cf. IV. 3. 27 where the ghost again represents his lower self).
His career of endless wandering, building and fighting is
preeminently an illustration of the external or environment-
al nature of civic virtue. But such virtue makes us resemble
the gods only 'to a degree', and the myth thus dramatizes a
deficiency which Plotinus elsewhere deals with more explicit-
ly. Only inner virtue is truly free, since civic virtue pre-
supposes external evils and is therefore under compulsion
(VI . 8 . 5 . 20f ) . Conventional values are imitations and 'traces'
of the paradeigms (1.2.2.19), but it is also true that they
merely imitate and are mere traces because they are tied to
3)body. Imitation is thus also a sign of inferiority, and
that is so because the noetic paradeigm is itself not 'vir-
4)tue ' . The paradeigm is beyond virtue, which exists only
in the soul (I.2.1.28f; 1.2.2.3; I.2.6.14f; 1.2.7.2). As a
result, though civic virtues do resemble the paradeigm, their
resemblance is remote and therefore largely illusory.
This startling assertion of discontinuity between phenomena
and paradeigm undergirds Plotinus 's radical deprecation of
conventional virtue. He explains the discontinuity further
by distinguishing the similarity between two things derived
from a common source from the similarity between two things,
one of which is derived from the other. In the former case
the two things must also resemble each other; in the latter
there need be no resemblance since the pair are not coordi-
nate and the superior member may be quite different (1.2.2.5
f ) . The second case is a rough application of the distinc-
tion between transcendent and immanent Form or instantiation:
as the Form of heat is not itself hot (I.2.1.32f), so the
Form of phenomenal virtue is not itself virtue or virtuous.
The inferiority of civic virtue lies in its being a merely
immanent empirical measure, which is in that respect unlike
its paradeigm. The oddness of the situation is marked by
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Plotinus ' s occasional apologetic use of the phrase 'as it
were' when speaking of the paradeigm (1.2.6.17; 1.2.7.3;
1.2.2.3); it is a paradeigm, but one whose difference is es-
pecially strange in this context. And the reason for the
discontinuity is at first sight equally odd: civic virtue
(i.e., 'measure') is not really like the pattern because no-
etic reality displays no 'order, arrangement or symmetry'
7)(1.2.1.45). We can see how drastic Plotinus's revision of
'virtue' is going to be.
The gap between civic virtue and the 'non-virtuous' para-
deigm has been opened in order to be filled by true virtue.
As virtue, it has some relation to body (as does civic vir-
tue) , but unlike civic virtue it is tied closely to the
paradeigm and is therefore 'very much a resemblance' {1.23J.I).
Since true virtue is an 'escape' to noetic reality (1.2.3.6;
1.8.7.12), in becoming different from physical reality it
becomes as 'like' as anything can be to the paradeigm.
We now have the following scheme. Secondary evils (physi-
cal misfortunes and moral evil) are evil by participation in
primary evil (i.e., matter, I.8.8.38f). Civic virtue, which
attempts to 'measure' secondary evil, is virtue by distant
participation in the noetic paradeigm. True virtue is for
the most part dissociated from secondary evil and beyond
'measure' because it participates in the noetic paradeigm
more directly.
primary evil
(matter, absolute
unmeasure)
secondary evil
(body, relative and
limited unmeasure)
civic virtue
. (body, relative
measure)
true virtue
(soul, beyond
measure)
noetic paradeigm
(beyond virtue)
This general pattern lies behind a passage like II.9.2.3f:
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There is one Mind, always the same and unchangeable, imitating
the Father [the One] as far as it can. One part of our soul is
always focused on noetic reality, another on phenomena, a third
is between them. For since the soul is one nature, at times all
of it is carried along with the best part, at times the worst
part is dragged down and takes with it the middle (for the whole
soul cannot be dragged down) . This happens to it when it does
not remain in the most beautiful sphere, where soul is not a
part [but whole] . .
.
As is often the case, a precise distribution of the phases
is difficult. The upper level may be true virtue, the mid-
dle may be civic virtue (embodying a realistic compromise)
,
and the lower may be a life of vice. Or perhaps the phases
should be shifted one step up: the lowest level would be
civic virtue, the middle true virtue (which from one point
of view also mediates) and the highest would be direct grasp
8
)
of noetic reality and therefore not 'virtue' at all.
All of this yields a strikingly negative view of true
virtue, epitomized in Plotinus's characterization of it as
9
)
'stripping' or 'purification' (1.2.3.9). Civic sophrosyne
measures desires, true sophrosyne simply eliminates them
(I.2.7.18f). The negativity comes to the surface most clear-
ly at two points: Plotinus's devaluation of conventional
virtue and the nature of his own metaphysical ethical prin-
ciples. The former is a standard feature of Platonism going
back to Plato's own criticism of 'demotic' virtue. The latter
are more complex and enable Plotinus to reshape virtue in two
closely related respects: true virtue turns out to be empiri-
cally empty and highly generic. The reality with which civic
virtue deals is in terms of Plotinus's ontology 'dimensional',
i.e., it is tied to the extended (spatial, temporal, material)
world which makes up the context or environment for the many
specific objects to which man reacts. It is discrete, con-
crete and divided (for the ' dividedness ' of soul and body,
cf. I.l.S.llf). Since Plotinus, however, takes account of a
second noetic world he must rethink ethics for a second,
wholly different situation: one that is not environmental or
contextual, that is radically unified and unextended, internal
rather than external and non-specific because there can be no
events
.
Conventional virtue, then, is limited by its own deficien-
cy, that is to say, by the environmental threats which it is
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forced to meet with a wide variety of 'measured' virtues or
goods: preservation of life, satisfaction of basic physical
needs (health, food, drink), adequate wealth, social stand-
ing and security, proper pleasure, political power, physical
beauty, commanding personal presence, artistic skills, sound
opinions and judgments, etc. Such implicitly futile goods
figure prominently in Plotinus's critique of astrology, which
is preoccupied with calculating ('measuring') relative goods
and evils. Thus in II. 3. 14 he lists various goods which fall
within the orbit of civic virtues and depend on environmental
factors (cf. to exo in II. 3. 12. 7). Conventional virtue at its
best was epitomized in the four cardinal virtues summed up by
Plotinus as follows (I.2.1.17f): wisdom is competence in dis-
cursive reasoning, bravery deals with aggressive impulses,
self-control balances desire and reason, justice is proper
distribution of authority and obedience. As products of hab-
it and training (and not of wisdom) such virtues are defined
by a social environment, and like it they are tied to vices
(I.1.10.12f) and entail 'sin' (true virtue is 'sinless':
1.2.6.1; I. 1.9. If; 1.1.12.1).
Deprecation of civic virtue is thus due to the radical
dissociation of soul from body on which Plotinus insists (e.g.,
I.l or III. 6. 1-6) and which he can conceive of in drastic
terms (e.g., his theory of multiple selves and unconscious
mental processes). Dual personality raises in acute form the
problem of the status of the empirical self, a problem implic-
it in Ennead I.l ('What is a living creature?'). Even some-
thing so obviously our own as sexual desire is called in
question: is man as a whole or some part of him its true
agent (I.1.5.25f)? In the next section Plotinus uses the
notion of soul's 'presence' (parousia) to define empirical man
as a combination of body and the image emitted by soul as it
is present to space. The elusiveness of such a creature leads
him in 1.1.7.6 to wonder how 'we' can be said to perceive, and
in 1.1.9.26 he still refers to the living creature in baffle-
ment - 'whatever it is.' This is the more striking because
Ennead I.l is one of the latest treatises; after a lifetime of
reflection Plotinus is still puzzled about something which
might well seem self-evident. Little wonder, then, that the
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civic virtue which goes with our ordinary selves is also
problematic. Virtue is needed by those faced by evils not
by those at peace, but that does not mean that virtue aims
at mastery of the environment. In fact, the soul's encounter
with eternals {ta exo) is more apt to occasion evil, and even
civic virtue is tied to necessity. True virtue, on the con-
trary, is abandonment of environment, 'fleeing from here'
and returning to the soul's 'ancient state' (II . 3 . 8 . 13f f )
.
In commenting again on the dictum 'one must flee from here'
Plotinus remarks that it does not mean actually leaving this
life but simply 'being just, holy and wise while living on
earth' (1.8.6.10). This sounds ordinary enough, but he in
fact redefines the major virtues in such a way that they are
unearthly, radically unified and emptied of specific content.
1.6.6
Self-control: no association
with bodily
1.2.6
reversion in-
ward to Mind
1.2.3.14
impassivity
Courage:
Wisdom:
pleasure
no fear of
death
noesis which
directs soul up-
ward and turns
it from lower
concerns (cf.
1.2.7.7)
impassivity due detachment
to likeness to from body
the impassive
paradeigm
contemplation
of Mind's con-
tent
solitary activ-
ity
soul's activity dominance of
toward Mind reason without
opposition from
other elements
These are highly abstract definitions, which reflect the fact
that truth is for Plotinus radically internal; we are soul and
do not 'have' a soul (1.1.13). Purified soul is, in fact,
a Form or logos (1.6.6.14; cf. 1.8.1.9), and at this level the
various virtues imply each other (1.2.7.1) in the sense that
they all ultimately reduce to thought. We can again see
why Plotinus refers to the Forms of virtues as ' quasi ' -para-
deigms - true virtue is so abstract and introverted that it
scarcely answers to concrete ethical experience.
Paul Plass 247
Plotinus describes the denial of environment and of its
empirical content in various ways. In simplest terms, true
virtue is 'closing the eyes' (1.6.8.4 and 25) - a natural
image (which also suggests connections to initiation) because
in Mind seeing becomes wholly internal as seer and seen coin-
cide (V. 8 . 10 . 35f ) . By the same token, waking up the soul is
making it 'cease to see the so-to-speak external sights' in
its dreams (III . 6 . 5 . lOf ) ; that is to say, empirical reality
is a mere dream. The wider social/physical context of civic
virtue is similarly denied when true beauty is sought not
in external bodies but in one's own or others' inward beauty
(1.6.5). Lovers accordingly 'long to withdraw themselves
from bodies' (1.6.5.7), as soul generally 'gathers itself
into its own places, so-to-speak' (1.2.5.6; cf. 1.8.14.31).
As we have seen, the noetic plane has no 'order, arrange-
12)
ment, or symmetry' (1.2.1.45). Moreover, the world soul
-
which occupies the highest position of any soul related to
body and can be said to have no environment because it is
not actually 'in' its body (III.4.4.4f) - dispenses with
ordinary self-control and bravery because it has nothing
external to fear, and it is without desire for pleasure be-
cause there is nothing external to acquire or enjoy (I.2.1J.lf;
cf. 1.1.2.13; cf. 1.4.11.11; 1 . 4 . 3 . 29 ) . "'"^ ^ Though the visi-
ble gods have matter, they do not suffer from moral evil
(I.8.5.31f), and by the same token they are beyond moral
virtue as is the world soul. The world soul thus serves as
a somewhat odd ethical model: when we can control our body
with ease, we will be 'like' the world soul or astral souls
(II. 9 . 18 . 22f ) . This combination of true virtue, cosmic order
and denial of environment proves to be useful to Plotinus in
his controversy with the Gnostics, who in their way shared
his rejection of environment. It enables him to take a mid-
dle position between their largely justified rejection of
earthly life as evil and their unjustified rejection of the
entire cosmos. Thus in II. 9. 5 and 7 he glosses over earthly
evils and points instead to heaven to show that creation as
a whole is the best possible. Starting as it does from the
premiss that good and evil are not defined in any decisive
way by the earthly environment, his line of argument is sound,
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But it requires that celestial life be treated in effect as
non-environmental, and Plotinus provides for that in his
doctrine that celestial souls care for celestial bodies auto-
matically, without deliberation and without involvement.
Detachment from environment is again a factor at work in
Plotinus ' s critique of astrology and its ethical implications.
His attack focusses on its preoccupation with the visible
universe (II. 3) and especially on its insistence that planets
are specific causes of individual external events. In fact,
true causation is psychic and unified. Astrology thus as-
signs the role of wholes to mere parts and ignores the inner
14)
autonomy of soul (e.g., II.3.15.15f) and of virtue. In
III. 1. If he broadens his criticism to include a wider vari-
ety of theories which emphasize external causation. But
soul in fact is the true cause, though it is so only when
free from external factors. His own view of providence is,
of course, bound to start from the undeniable fact that the
goodness of the universe is mixed with evil and is dependent
in part on the components of the universe being in their
proper environment. But all such contextual and relative
value is subordinate to the wholly unified logos which under-
girds specific goods and evils: 'The universal logos is one,
though divided into unequal parts', (III . 2 . 17 . 75 ; cf. III. 3.1).
Our bodies are subject to astrological and magical influences
(IV.4.40ff) since what is external can indeed be 'charmed',
but Plotinus is skeptical about any influence which stars
might have on character (IV. 4 . 31 . 40f ) . He is guided by the
same principle that leads him to deny creation of the uni-
verse in time: specific decisions are impossible in the noetic
world because they presuppose time. Creation in time would be
a specific event, hence derivation of the universe from the
noetic world is intelligible only if it is non-temporal and
non-specific. In the same way, while the world soul as a
(timeless) whole exercises choice (prohairesis , IV. 4 . 35 . 21f ) ,
its (temporal) parts do not, and in any case world soul's
choice is directed not toward realizing specific empirical
events but toward the Good. That is why it is an ethical
model, and since the Good - i.e., the One - is empty of em-
pirical content and devoid of any environment, true virtue in
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its own way must be denial of both empirical content and en-
vironment. 'Lives, fates and choices' are 'indicated' but
not 'caused' by stellar patterns (IV. 3 . 12 . 22) , while virtue
is entirely free (IV. 4. 39. 2). Hence it - not specific
external events - is the decisive cause. Providence thus
stands to the universe much as true virtue stands to daily
life: both respond to the specific demands of empirical
existence, yet neither is immanent because their intention
or vision remains non-specific. Though he is sympathetic to
the inwardness of Stoic ethics, this line of thought leads
Plotinus to reject their understanding of happiness as 'ra-
tional life'. He does so because as materialists (who also
accepted astrology) they are bound to understand life in
environmental terms (I.4.2.32f). Their contention that the
wise man is happy even in the bull of Phalaris is admirable
(and true) enough, but not demonstrable on materialist prem-
isses (1.4.13.7). Happiness must instead be focussed in
noetic life so that it is not an (external) quality of life
but radically at one with it (I.4.3.16f). Once inside this
spaceless world, soul enjoys true virtue which is simply 'to
be active alone', free of interaction with an environment
{apathes: 1.2.3.15) .
The other feature of noetic reality is its paradeigmatic
or generic character. The paradeigms are generic because
they are non-spatial and non-temporal . The former property
is guaranteed to true virtue by the radical simplicity and
unity which we have considered. The latter is argued for at
length in 1.5, where Plotinus shows that true happiness is
totally independent of temporal events. Because it is time-
less {ou ahronikon) and dimensionless {adiastaton, 1.5.7.24), it
provides no environment for specific events, and any external
factors that do flow from it - e.g., 'fine actions' and their
'results', I.5.10.13f - are irrelevant, since (as facets of
ciyic virtue) they can be measured, while true virtue cannot
be temporally quantified (I.5.3f). The timelessness of true
virtue can be indicated by tense forms suggesting absence of
process. The state of 'being purified' is inferior to that
of 'having been purified' (1.2.4.4; 1.2.7.9; cf. 'having been
turned' to Mind, 1.2.4.17; 1.4.11.8). True virtue makes
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temporal psychic processes superfluous, for they take place
in the 'trace' (or 'light' or 'image') projected by soul
directly into the body in order to share in its life (I.1.6ff).
That trace disappears (I. 1.10. 11; 1.1.12.30) when separation
from the processes rooted in genesis takes place. The adverb
"ede (how', 'already') often signals the instant of transition
from temporal process to a frozen, timeless state. In 1.2.4.5
'ede is combined with the timeless perfect tense: 'the virtue
in being purified is less complete than that in having been
purified, for the latter is already i^de) a sort of end or
perfection.' 'True pleasures go with the presence of (true)
goods and are not in movement or process, for now (ede) the
goods are present' (1.4.12.5); desire for true life is not
desire for past or future but for 'what now (ede) is' (1.5.2.13;
cf. 1.1.10.6; 1.4.4.14; and perhaps 1.1.9.19 and 1.1.7.12).
Though Plotinus can speak of our identity (tautotes) with
god in purification (1.2.5.2), he commonly observes the dis-
tinction between true virtue and its paradeigm - i.e., be-
tween soul and Mind - and thus turns true virtue into the
conceptual grasp of Forms which structure phenomena. Virtue
is a direct vision or recollection of Forms but we still only
17)
receive their immaterial impression (typos), just as vision
is distinct from its object (1.2.4.19; cf. 1.2.7.6). Mind
itself grasps by direct touch, soul by contemplation. Vir-
tue is 'someone's', while each paradeigm is 'of itself',
without parts. Civic justice expresses itself in multiple
parts, while true justice is 'activity in one's own sphere'
but now in a true 'one' (I.2.6.13f). In the next section
(1.2.7) Plotinus offers definitions of the paradeigms of vir-
tue. Wisdom (noesis) is simply itself, i.e., 'episteme' or
'sophia'; self-control is 'relation to itself'; justice is 'an
entity's own activity'; bravery is 'freedom from matter and
purity in itself.' If we add these definitions to the defi-
nitions of virtue (above, p. 246)/ we have the following,
progressively introverted grades: civic justice (for example)
is keeping to one's place in the world, true justice is focus-
sing one's reason on Mind, the paradeigm is Mind's internal
activity. The contrast between the two virtues is that be-
tween our experience of specific instantiations (in civic
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virtue) and our knowledge of the true virtues as objective,
generic structures. Objectivity is preeminently a mark of
Forms, and that phase of true virtue comes to the fore
throughout 1.4 as Plotinus contends that well-being is a
wholly objective state independent even of consciousness.
The notion of universals is explicitly introduced in the
discussion of the relationship between dialectic and virtue
in 1.3.6. Plotinus begins with the general statement that
ethics takes its theory from dialectic and adds (concrete)
'discipline and character'. Other (moral) virtues apply
discursive reasoning to specific passions and actions; wis-
dom {phvoriesis) is an additional discursive reason dealing
with specifics yet doing so in a more universal way (katholou)
,
while dialectic and sophia, in turn, provide 'in universal
form without matter' everything needed by wisdom. It is not
clear whether true virtue is restricted to the last phase or
whether it includes one of the other phases. In any case,
soul answers to the level of virtue which it has reached and
so it too is either universal or particular: when separate
(i.e., in true virtue) it is not individual but whole (pasa)
,
and when not separate it focusses on (epistatousa) an external
object and is partial (VI . 4 . 16 . 32f )
.
The philosopher, then, has substantially abandoned civic
virtue yet still lives in an environment, and that fact forces
Plotinus toward the notion of multiple and partially uncon-
scious selves. We have two selves (1.1.10.5; I.1.7.17f); in
so far as the philosopher is wholly free of involuntary im-
pulses he is a god 'following the First,' but if they per-
sist 'he is a double person - god and demon -or rather he
has with him someone else who has a different virtue' (1.2.6.
3f ) . For all its metaphysical abstractness and preoccupation
with the true self Plotinus 's ethical theory is forced to
remain concrete at the point of overlap between the two realms,
and that is where we have some idea of what a life of true vir-
tue is actually like.
In 1.4.4-6 and 11 Plotinus analyzes human motivation in
terms of a loose distinction between non-environmental will
(boutesis) and environmental wish {thelein) . The former is the
driving force of true virtue and expresses its unity; in
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willing we 'are what we have' and seek no more because will
embraces its object for its own sake. But there are environ-
mental factors to be considered, too. Though necessities are
not objects of will, the man of true virtue does 'know' them
and uses discursive reason to avoid difficulties. The dis-
tinction, then, comes to this:
(A) we do not wiZZ to avoid evils (though we wish to do so)
(B) rather, we wiZZ not to have to avoid them (i.e., we will
18)
to be safe in Mind)
.
Plotinus shows that will is dissociated from environment by
noting (1.4.6.26) that we are indifferent to health - i.e.,
we do not truly will it - when we have it. (B) corresponds
to the denial of environment in true virtue. Civic virtue
and 'wish' are introduced into the discussion of motivation
in 1.4.11. The good man 'would wish' that all evils be gone
and all men prosper (=A) , though his happiness is not affect-
ed if they do not. But if such a wish is wholly serious (i.e.,
if it becomes something willed) it is absurd, for evils are
bound to exist. A serious and authentic 'will' can only be
internal (=B) . (A) is a gesture of common decency to the
concerns of civic virtue; to wish evils away - sincerely but
not too seriously - is (so to speak) a pious fraud pointing to
the ambiguity of true virtue's relation to the world. The
serious wish is a violation of (A), i.e., it is the illusion
that specific evils can really be dealt with on their own
1 n
19)level.
In I.4.14.21f Plotinus remarks that a young man actually
is better off if he experiences poor health. An old man
needs neither pleasure nor pain, and though he will resist
pain with his natural powers, health is not of real worth to
him. Will and wish overlap in a delicate balance here be-
tween 'willed' denial of environment and 'wished' response
to it. Plotinus 's view of suicide follows the same pattern
(1.9). It is not permissible because we are bound to care
for our body, but we do so by allowing it to die, i.e., neg-
lecting to kill it. Not specifically killing it is the
'positive' gesture of 'wishing' care toward the most immedi-
ate environment which we have - a gesture so void of content,
however, that it is simultaneously a 'willing' generic denial
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of the environment as such.
The residual empirical life of the man who has attained
true virtue, then, has an oddly suspended quality to it. He
is like the stars or like a 'great and beautiful statue stud-
ded in face and chest with stars' (III . 2 . 14 . 25f ) - images
which are suggestive both of remoteness and unreality. On
the one hand, the wise man responds to the demands of cir-
cumstance and in his personal relationships he is neither
unfriendly nor insensitive. Yet there is a touch of uninten-
tional irony when Plotinus adds that as the wise man is to
others 'so he is to himself (1.4.15.23). He is anything
but well-disposed to himself in any ordinary sense of the
term, and in respect to others he can group pity with envy
and jealousy as examples of moral evils to which true virtue
is superior (I . 1. 10 . 14f ) . The wise man 'knows' death, but
the distress he feels at the death of friends and relatives
affects only his irrational part; 'he himself' simply refuses
to accept grief (I.4.4.32f; III . 2 . 15 . 49f ) . Because his know-
ledge is generic he is immune to specific grief. Though evil
men have a place in the scheme of things, part of that scheme
is that we do not feel sympathy for them (III . 2 . 17 . 15) . After
death the higher part of soul is still able to recollect with-
out passion the best experience transmitted to it from the
lower soul: friends, children, wife, country. But gradually
it forgets them too, 'for it is best even on earth to detach
oneself from human concerns' (IV. 3. 32). As we have seen,
Plotinus criticized the Stoics for failing to justify their
conviction that the wise man is happy even in Phalaris ' bull.
They failed because as materialists they had ho way of truly
transcending the material environment and its values. Ploti-
nus himself meets the difficulty with his conception of a
non-environmental self. But in a sense he succeeds too well.
For if our true self is radically free from body, 'we' are
detached not only from emotional distress but from everything
20)phenomenal, and Plotinus does not justify the continuing
21)involvement in ordinary life which he evidently assumes.
In III. 6. 5.1 he raises the question of what role philosophy
can have if the soul is essentially passionless, and he does
22)
not really find an adequate answer. The picture sketched
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in Porphyry's Life illustrates the contradiction: Plotinus is
deeply engaged in some ordinary concerns of life, wholly in-
different to others. The situation is epitomized in the
curious account of how he was 'present at once to himself
and to others' (8.12f) and so could carry on a social con-
versation without breaking the train of his philosophic
thought.
In Plotinus' ethical theory, then, the wise man sees ordi-
nary life as a routine, ritual or play. He views the world
of temporal events as though he were a spectator in a theater
(III . 2. 15 . 44f ) . His seat is the noetic world made up of fixed
patterns, the temporal world is the stage of free will and
chance, and the two are held together by providence, which
brings into events such coherence as they have. The Forms
are very general patterns quite different from time; on the
other hand, events are highly specific occurrences quite dif-
ferent from Forms, and as a function of transcendent soul
providence binds the two. It does so by embodying the pattern
of events and thus constitutes a 'transcendent' time in so
far as it embodies timeless patterns. This elusive intermedi-
ate region is characterized by Plotinus in terms that recall
his distinction between the phase of virtue that consists in
'being purified' and the phase that 'has been purified'; like
the latter, the pattern 'has been written' (11.3.7.6). Else-
where Plotinus likens providence to a play which is already
written by the cosmic playwright and which we perform in time
(III . 2 . 15 . 25f ; 17f ) . True virtue is what guides a man who
lives his life in accordance with the supra-temporal 'script.'
From this point of view the Forms become in effect a collec-
tion of rough sketches, an epitome or shorthand version of
the story-line of time. Providence and true virtue are ge-
neric, time and civic virtue are specific. Time, i.e., dis-
cursive 'history', occurs when the pattern is actually played
out under the influence of free will and chance, while the
pattern itself is generic in the sense that it is a fixed
outline contained in logoi or Forms. True virtue is the
code which shapes the life of a man who exists in both worlds
but who in a very special sense only 'goes through the motions'
because he lives for true, motionless reality. This generic
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view of things is bound to lend a sense of unreality, remote-
ness and ambiguity to the experience of time. ' The choice
of lives in Plato's myth of Er suggests such a generic view
of time, and in III. 4.5 Plotinus does interpret the choice
of a complete 'life-type' (bios) along with a guardian daemon
as a symbol for soul's 'universal, general choice and dis-
position. ' Soul's choice reflects its character and that has
a pretemporal dimension. Hence when Plotinus himself uses
astrological motifs (e.g., each soul enters its temporal life
as though boarding a ship and Necessity then assigns it a
seat, 6.48f), he is not thinking primarily of specific, im-
manent material causes but of generic causation. Life and
its values are intelligible only from a general, timeless
point of view, and that is especially true of the wise man,
who sees his own life as an exemplification of noetic reality
24)m the form of true virtue. Taken in conjunction with the
world soul's role as model for true virtue (above, p. 247),pas-
sages which speak of individual souls joining the world soul
in governance of the universe (e.g., IV. 8. 2. 20) again imply
a non-discursive grasp of time - now on a scale much larger
than that in the choice of an individual life. True virtue
is an assimilation of our lower to our higher self resulting
in 'felt realization of immortality, of the goodness of Provi-
dence, of the existence in eternal reality of the world of
25)Forms.' It is not yet a full vision of the One, and since
it is part of continuing though detached earthly life it em-
bodies the ambivalence which Plotinus himself catches in the
distinction between the present and perfect tenses of 'puri-
fication' (above, p. 249 )• As everything environmental is
stripped away the soul becomes at once empty and full, be-
cause in terms of Platonic ontology to be emptied of pheno-
menal reality is to be filled with true reality.
Even the peroration which ends 1.6 has a notably abstract
flavor despite its hymnic eloquence. We must chisel off un-
wanted parts to make ourselves into fine statues and permit
the 'godlike glory of virtue to shine out.' Then we will not
be hindered in 'becoming one' and 'being pure with ourselves';
in fact we will be pure light or all eye, not 'measured by
spatial dimensions great or small' but 'unmeasured' because
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we are greater than any measure. Chiseling is 'being puri-
fied', the glory which shines out is 'having been purified',
the 'measure' is civic virtue, and the transmutation into
statue, eye or light is true virtue.
University of Wisconsin
NOTES
1) Cf. VI.3.16.27f for immanent civic or practical virtues which do
achieve what is desirable and not merely necessary, II.9.9.14f emphasizes
the competition in civic virtue through which each gets what he deserves
(though the results do not in any case really matter)
.
2) Since virtue is the function of a moral agent, it is 'measure' in
the soul rather than in the body, and soul then becomes a kind of 'matter'
(I.2.2.19f). By using the Form/matter model Plotinus can make soul itself
'measured' in respect to virtue or Form and 'measuring' in respect to mat-
ter. As logos, soul carries Form into matter.
3) 'Trace', 'shadow' or 'image' are regular terms for the lowest lev-
els of soul's activity (e.g., IV. 3. 10. 39; IV. 4. 18. 7; IV. 4. 19. 3).
4) Cf. 'Quantity does not itself have quantity' (II. 4. 9. 5). Forms
are not qualities (II. 6), which are not properly parts of noetic being
and scarcely of phenomenal being either. They are rather empirical
states subsequent to 'being, ' and when Plotinus mentions 'virtues and
vices, beauty and ugliness' (II.6.2.23f) he is thinking of qualitative,
empirical civic virtues as opposed to the paradeigms. 1.8.8: Form by
itself 'does' nothing and therefore matter must be the cause of (empiri-
cal) evil. Soul comes under a similar principle. As something simple
it does not admit what it causes in others (1.1.2.7), e.g., it gives
body power to have passions but itself remains apathes (1.1.6.5). For
soul as Form cf. 1.8,1.9.
5) In 1.2.1.52 he admits how drastic his position is by promising
'persuasion' in addition to the 'force' of the argument which establishes
the discontinuity.
6) The restatement of the distinction in I.2.7.25f apparently treats
the three things in the former case as all coordinate. For when Plotinus
says that one must abandon the life of the good man as defined by civic
virtue and emulate the gods, he is implying that in the similarity which
civic virtue entails there is only an immanent standard: good men are
similar to another good man who is their model. They are not similar to
the genuine paradeigm of virtue as is the man of true virtue.
7) As a Form, true Beauty, too, is not a matter of symmetry but of
simplicity (I.6.1.21f; cf. VI. 7. 22. 25). Cf, I.2.3.20f: true virtue is
soul's pure activity (thought), and that genuinely resembles the para-
deigm. At the same time, since only soul and not Form is 'disposed',
even true virtue is unlike the paradeigm.
8) Since Plotinus thinks hierarchically, multiple levels of virtue
appear frequently in the Enneads . III.5,1.25f: (1) love of true beauty.
Paul Plass 257
(2) 'sinless' and restrained love of physical beauty (i.e., civic virtue),
(3) vice. V.9.1: (1) some divine men are able to 'fly home above the
clouds', (2) others fall back to a life of (civic) virtue, (3) others
never rise above matter. IV. 4. 17 treats the three levels in 'Augustinian'
terms as three cities: (1) the best city is ruled by the man of reason,
(2) the middle preserves a certain degree of order, (3) the lowest is popu-
lar misrule. II. 9. 9 : (1) men of true virtue, (2) men of civic virtue,
(3) the mob, which provides necessities for its betters. III. 2.8: (1)
some men are like gods, (2) some are like animals, (3) the majority are
in between and deservedly end up as the victims of the worst men because
they neglect to discipline themselves. Plotinus probably would here
connect the majority with civic virtue, which he views more optimistical-
ly in the next section (9.20f). Plotinus ' s theory of the major planes
on which soul exists provides the model into which the three levels of
virtue and vice fit: (1) All-soul, (2) world soul and celestial souls,
(3) individual souls in bodies. IV. 8. 2: souls at the intermediate lev-
el are not properly 'in' bodies or are so only in a universal, 'whole'
manner, while other souls 'go farther into body' to become 'partial' and
specific (cf. IV. 3. 17).
9) Cf . J. Trouillard, 'Valeur Critique de la Mystique Plotinienne,
'
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 59 (1961), 440. For the negative, intro-
verted and asocial nature of virtue cf. R. Arnou, Le Desir de Dieu (U.
Gregorienne: Rome, 1957) , 43f (for Plotinus men do not have relation-
ships with each other but like radii run parallel and meet only in the
center, 47); P. Hadot, 'Le Mythe de Narcisse et son Interpretation par
Plotin,' Eouvetle Revue de Psychoanalyse 13 (1976), 105f; O. Becker,
Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung (de Gruyter: Berlin, 1940),
26f ; P. Hadot, Plotin ou la Simplioite du Regard (Plon: Paris, 1963) , 70f
.
10) For a more detailed classification cf. W. Himmerich, Eudaimonia
(Triltsch: Wurzburg, 1959) , 150. Himmerich identifies the noetic para-
deigms with the four major classes of Being (153f )
.
11) For the close connection of mind and virtue cf. VI.8.5.34: virtue
is a 'kind of mind' or mind's energeia (VI. 2 .18.15)
.
12) Mind, of course, does have complex order from another point of
view, since it is made up of many Forms (e.g., 1.2.7). All physical
order - especially that of the universe - is derived from Mind.
13) Soul and the universe do not get anything from 'outside' (circular
motion has no exo , II. 2. 1.11), but they do take from 'higher' planes of
reality (1.2.1.15; 1.2.4.18; 1.2.6.18). The word ekeithen ('from yonder')
often marks this second, non-external relation. For the doctrine of inner
and outer energeia (the latter being spatial activity in the case of soul)
cf. V.1.3.8f; V.1.6; V.3.7.26f; I.1.2.8f. Civic virtue is a form of the
latter.
14) In so far as their determinism reduces all causes to one great
pantheistic cause the Stoics' understanding of astrology might be thought
of as itself highly generic. Plotinus observes that such a single cause
is tantamount to absence of any cause (III.1.4.12f ) , and in any case
strictly immanent, material causation cannot be generic in his sense of
the term because it exists only in its instances. Cf. G. Clark, 'Plotinus'
Theory of Empirical Responsibility,' The New Scholasticism 17 (1943), 18f.
15) Cf. V. 1.2. 30 for world soul directing the universe by boulesis;
VI. 8. 5. 20: boule and logos are free, while (civic) virtue depends on ex-
ternal actions.
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16) The pairs oTrioTizomene/choT-lste in 1.1.10.9 and anaahoresis/
chorismos in 1.1.12.18 perhaps point to the same distinction; for the
perfect tense marking a timeless state cf. 1.4.4.15.
17) Throughout 1.2.4 Plotinus struggles to preserve a distinction be-
tween Mind and soul (and true virtue). Cf. VI. 5. 7. 3 for typoi as infe-
rior to the full identity of subject and object in Mind. In V. 9. 13. 11
he moves a step closer to identity: the virtues in our soul on earth are
not merely images of the noetic patterns, but the patterns are 'here in
some other way.
'
18) Cf. 1.4.8.28: we do not wish misfortune (=A) , rather, we set vir-
tue against it to make the soul difficult to disturb, (i.e., we will
avoidance of the possibility of grief =B) . In III.8.6.5f Plotinus ob-
serves that men of action seek to internalize the object of their activi-
ty by 'knowing' it. That is to say, all men really 'will' to have and be
the Good as they 'wish' to have goods. VI. 8. 5 and 6: soul 'wills' not to
need to exercise (civic) virtue and does not 'plan' (='wish') to be af-
fected by necessary external events, but when it is, it takes whatever
steps are needed to preserve its inner autonomy (=its 'will'). But Ploti-
nus often ignores a distinction between wish and will.
19) Cf. I. 4. 7. If: A man of true virtue does 'wish' to have necessities,
since external evils may be fatal or at least may intrude into the rela-
tionship between soul and true being as an unwelcome third. This = (A)
.
I. 2. 6. If: drastic curtailment of bodily demands makes us 'sinless', but
our true intent [spoude) 'is not to be sinless but to be gods.' Apotheo-
sis is (B) ; sinless detachment from the body here seems equivalent to (A),
i.e., the lower phase of true virtue in which we are 'being purified',
-
'sin' is civic virtue. 1.4.7. 33f is especially interesting. Only an odd
man would be content to die before witnessing (say) the enslavement of his
daughters on the ground that an evil he has not seen cannot happen. Every-
one knows that such specific evils may and will occur (this seems to be
the force of an doxai hos kai genesomenou) , (though we all wish that they
do not =A) . But if the possibility does not affect our happiness, the
actual event should not do so either (=B) . The argument is that if even
in the case of ordinary virtue happiness is not held hostage to the un-
certainty of temporal life (where many things may or may not happen) , all
the more in the case of true virtue should it not be affected when evil
actually occurs. It is precisely the aim of true virtue to turn such de-
tachment from actual evil into a way of life, (though Plotinus goes on to
mention purely empirical reasons - some people are better off, after all,
for being slaves, and suicide in any case is always available; cf. III. 2.
18.17f). His fundamental point is that 'overcoming' specific evils by
merely avoiding them is empty; they must be made to vanish once for all
in a generic view of existence.
20) Though Plotinus admits that civic virtues are a necessary stage
for true virtue (I.3.6.15f), it ultimately makes them irrelevant (1.2.7.
23f) . In fact, if body ceased to exist, soul would not be distressed
(II. 1.4. 33; cf. II.9.7,23f and V.5.12.43f for the general principle of
high level indifference to lower levels)
.
21) For Plotinus 's failure fully to integrate ethics into metaphysics
cf. J. Rist, The Road to Reality (Cambridge U: Cambridge, 1967), 165f.
Another aspect of the same problem is the ambiguous status of soul's de-
scent: in so far as emanation is necessary, the descent is neutral or
good, but in so far as it is a subjective, willed 'fall' the descent is
evil. Rist, 112f; H. Blumenthal, Plotinus's Psychology (Nijhoff: The
Hague, 1971), 4f; J. Katz, Plotinus' Search for the Good (Columbia U:
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N.Y., 1950), 52f; V. Schubert, Pronoia und Logos (Pustet: Munich and
Salzburg, 1968), 103f; H. Schlette, Das Sine und das Andere (Hueber: Mu-
nich, 1966), 204f, 224; Clark (above, n. 14), 16f.
22) Cf
.
Blumenthal (above, n. 21) , 54f , 66, who reduces the difficulty
to some extent by construing apathes as 'morally resistant to evil.'
23) The elusiveness of temporal existence comes out also in the elu-
siveness of our empirical self; cf. H. Buchner, Plotins l^ogliohkeitslehpe
(Pustet: Munich and Salzburg, 1971) , 111 on the desire of the human soul
to destroy itself; Himmerich (above, n. 10), 73f, 84; Blumenthal (above,
n. 21), 109f; G. O'Daly, Plotinus ' Philosophy of the Self (Irish U: Shan-
non, 1973); Rist, 'Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus,'
American Journal of Philology 49 (1967) , 417f
.
24) This typically abstract NeoPlatonic view of life may have contrib-
uted to the intellectual climate which produced the deficient medieval
sense of time and history (P. Burke, The Renaissance Sense of the Past,
Arnold: London, 1969, If, 19).
25) Rist (above, n. 23), 419f.
